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Executive summary: 
1) Group composed of pork industry representatives (National Pork Board, National Pork Producers 
Council, American Association of Swine Veterinarians, Swine Health Information Center), vitamin 
manufacturers and blenders (Adisseo, ADM, Cargill, DSM, JNJ Oriental, Land O’ 
Lakes/Purina/NutraBlend, VitaPlus), University of Minnesota, and feed industry (American Feed 
Industry Association) acknowledged that contaminated feed and feed ingredients can be a vector of 
ASF transmission. Therefore, it is imperative that actions be taken to avoid virus entry into the U.S. 
from feed products and cross-contamination. 
2) Vitamin suppliers have industry wide standards for ingredient safety that minimize the opportunity 
for virus introduction. However, pork producers are responsible for knowing their suppliers and 
asking the right questions to screen potential suppliers that do not follow standards of safety. A 
comprehensive description of the entire vitamin supply chain is needed and a unified, accurate, and 
consistent message to the pork industry.  Several vitamins are produced exclusively in China, while 
others are also primarily produced in China by a few manufacturers. Likewise, most vitamin 
manufacturers produce human and animal grade vitamins using the same quality assurance and 
controls that meet human grade standards. 
3) Most meeting participants consider the risk of ASF introduction from vitamins to be low but 
recognize that, if contaminated, vitamins can be a vehicle for virus introduction in the U.S. 
a. Preliminary observations of vitamin manufacturing suggest: 
i. Vitamins are produced by chemical or fermentation processes, which use time, 
temperature, and pH conditions that are likely to inactivate the virus. Post-processing 
sanitation and transportation practices are essential to prevent cross contamination. 
ii. Pure, concentrated forms of vitamins are produced and transported into the U.S. at 
the highest concentration possible to decrease transportation cost. Therefore, there is 
almost no blending with carriers or post-processing at the place of origin (e.g. China). 
iii. Gelatin coatings are applied to some vitamins (e.g.Vit A, D3) to provide stability and 
reduce potency losses, but may be a source of virus in vitamin products. However, 
most manufactures use multiple processes (e.g. extraction, sterilization) that are 
likely to inactivate the virus in gelatin. 
iv. However, blending of choline chloride with corn cobs at the country of origin (e.g. 
China) may be of concern that needs to be investigated. 
b. Preliminary observations of the vitamin supply chain: 
i. Most suppliers pack vitamins in sealed containers and have extended chain of 
custody of products (> 80 days). Additional holding times may decrease vitamin 
potency. However, current holding times (approx. 90 days) from the time of 
manufacturing, and the duration of extended holding times in vitamin premixes 
before use in commercial feed mills (approx. 6 months) seem sufficient to inactivate 
the ASF virus based on current research information. 
ii. There are 3rd party certification programs (GMA, GMP+, FAMI-Q) that likely 
decrease chances of product cross contamination with blood, feces, and animal 
products that may be contaminated with the ASF virus. 
iii. All participants acknowledge that the existence of unconventional, non-certified, or 
uninspected suppliers may pose a heightened risk of ASF introduction. Therefore, all 
participants recommend that pork producers know their vitamin suppliers and 
request documentation to verify that vitamin sources use certification programs. 
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Developing a simple questionnaire or decision-tree for pork producers may help 
with screening vitamin suppliers.  
 
 
Figure 1. Generalized diagram of vitamins manufacturing and supply chain 
4) Research and development: 
a. A surrogate for ASF virus can be a useful method for monitoring processes that can inactivate 
the virus if it was present. 
b. Develop 3rd party biosecurity modules and audits that could be implemented for feed 
ingredient manufacturers.  
c. Risk assessment of virus transmission throughout the vitamin supply chain would be useful. 
d. Blockchain technology could be used for transparency and trust in the vitamin supply chain. 
5) Communication: 
a. A clear, transparent, and unified message is needed to educate the feed and pork industry to 
decrease confusion and suspicion of the perceived risks of virus transmission in the vitamin 
supply chain. Key components of this story include: 1) what is known about ASF virus 
characteristics, survival, and inactivation, 2) general description of raw materials, chemical 
and fermentation processes used to produce various vitamins, 3) current quality assurance 
programs, 4) packaging and transport, 5) potential for cross contamination from other porcine 
derived feed ingredients in multi-species feed mills, 6) approved sources vs. brokers and 
traders, and 7) holding times, origin of carriers, and premix manufacturing processes used 
before delivery to feed mills and commercial swine farms. 
 
Introduction: 
• Dr. Shurson read anti-trust guidelines (handed out before meeting) 
• ASF continues to spread and is a significant threat to U.S. agriculture.  
• Some vitamins have been identified as potential risk factors 
• Pre-workshop survey results: motivation 
o Learn about vitamin industry 
o Share knowledge and concern 
o Determine if a surrogate ASFv screening assay would be useful 
o Determine relative risk and mitigation strategies  
o Develop educational materials 









Groups assessment of risk (participants were asked for their assessment of risk and reasons why): 
• Low 
o Risk is low because gelatin in vitamin A was only one of a few potential contamination 
sources and cross-contamination during blending was limited because blending occurs 
predominantly in the U.S. There are biosecurity controls through supply chain. 
o Manufacturing process and facilities have safe practices already in place resulting in 
minimal risk for cross contamination 
o Long supply chain from China, large number of days during shipment before the mix is 
incorporated into premix (estimate average over 80 days) 
o 3rd party audit validates best practices, this is a documented process 
o Survival of ASFv has raised some concerns - feed and feed ingredients should be on our 
radar after PEDv  
o Note: Participant pointed out it has not been 100% confirmed that PEDv was initially 
introduced by feed, but was later confirmed that it was likely disseminated in feed after 
entry. Participant: PEDv is completely different from ASFv, but shares characteristics 
with longevity and survival ability. Can take lessons from PEDv but cannot make 
assumptions on how ASFv will behave. Difficult to prove Koch’s postulate: evidence 
does not need to be 100% to allow you to move forward. 
o Post-processing contamination of vitamins could be a risk, but there is a potentially 
higher risk for other feed ingredients. 
o Production practices and manufacturing processes prevent entry. Feed/vitamins likely not 
the reason it gets here, but can potentially be the reason that it spreads. 
o USDA risk assessment supports low risk. Also, the volume of imported vitamins 
compared to other feed ingredient imports is low, and there is a low diet inclusion level 
of vitamins.  
o Animals can be infected by eating contaminated feed, but there is currently no research 
on the amount of contamination identified. 
o Chain of custody in Company 1 is 120 days. Once it is in blend facility there are multiple 
supplier questionnaires that are reviewed and vetted before blending (this is done on a 
global basis). Concerns will lead to facility audit. 
o There is a global standard quality system because a large amount of vitamins go to the 
human food industry and so they have higher standard and are produced using the same 
production processes and lines. 
o Since the ASF outbreak in China, the Minister of Agriculture in the Chinese government 
provides information on the infected areas, and plan can be adjusted based on current 
threats.  
o Closed packaging system (double package possibly?) 
o Dee research did not support survival over 34 days in Vitamin D. Note: Dee research 
paper had sample size of 2. 
o Production facilities have low likelihood of contamination with manure, blood, and other 
fluids 
o What is Food Safety Modernization Act?  
o Should ASFv be considered a hazard that should be controlled like salmonella?  
o Vitamin production occurs in a well-controlled environment and it is easy to limit 
potential contamination.  
o Vitamins produced by chemical synthesis controls potential viral load 
o Note: There is a range in relative risk in the low category where pork producers would 
like risk to be 0, not negligible risk. There may be tension between producer expectations 






o Low doses can still contribute to high cross contamination risk 
o Chemical synthesis, fermentation pathways (using corn for fermentation), choline 
chloride has corn cob carrier. This overall produces higher risk when lumping them all 
together because of potential contamination of one potential source. 
o Initial media attention and serious concerns of producers 
o Amount of focus in the room 
o The challenge is not our assessment- the challenge is the producer’s assessment and the 
producer risk assessment is medium. Producers have concerns on what the vitamins are 
mixed with and the country of origin of the carriers used. We need of clear and accurate 
communication of messages to pork producers.  
 
• High 
o Pre-emptive. If the consequences are very high and severe, we instead should expect high 
initial concern until we conduct a risk assessment and determine lower risk. In addition, 
vitamins are included in every swine diet and used at high volume and frequency.  
o Pork producers will be concerned if we didn’t ask difficult enough questions. 
o Note: Risk models take into account severity and likelihood of occurrence. Most people 
focus on likelihood, we also need to consider severity as this is commonly the producer 
perspective.  
o Note: Companies reacted based on their knowledge and had different responses from 
suppliers, increased producer perceived risk. Need to keep pork producer concerns and 
perceptions in mind. 
o Note: There are a lot of other foreign animal diseases that are more difficult to eliminate 
than ASFv. We should also think of this as a foreign animal disease challenge through a 
supply chain and not only focus on ASFv.  
o Note: There is limited information on ASFv and we need to be careful not to generalize 
virus transmission in feed. Control strategies in place right now may not be effective 
against this virus. Therefore, we need some focus on ASFv because it is not as well 
understood.   
o Note: Concern is different from risk 
 
• Group Assessment Summary: Majority of participants viewed ASFv transmission from the 
vitamin supply chain as a low risk situation due to current production practices and procedures in 
the vitamin supply chain. It was also frequently noted that the low diet inclusion rate and 
extended length of time between production in China and when it reaches the pig in a diet reduces 
risk of transmission. On the medium threat level, views focused on unknowns in cross 
contamination and taking into account producer concerns.  
o Continue working together as an expanded team 
o Our initial focus should be ASFv, but we also need to remember that there are multiple 




• Current status: 116 officially reported Chinese ASFv cases, 900,000 pigs culled, but producers 
say cases are under reported. About 20-30% of pigs have been lost and there are massive 
depopulations taking place. 
• Virus is able to survive in specific ingredients based on Trans-Atlantic and Trans-Pacific models 




• ASFv was able to survive in positive control media, which is unique. No other viruses evaluated 
were able to do that. Feed ingredients gave it some sort of protection instead of just surviving. 
• We need to be careful not to generalize among all vitamins because chemical forms, production 
processes, and coatings and carriers vary among vitamin types. Descriptions of the different 
characteristics, carriers, and coatings are needed when developing educational materials. 
• What makes an ingredient a high or low risk? pH, moisture, carrier? 
• Two pieces to the equation - Can it become contaminated? How long can it survive?  
• Higher risk of infection through water in one exposure, when the number of exposures increases 
(as it would on a farm with pigs eating multiple times), the probability of infection dramatically 
increases to 25% with a very low TCID50 (Niederwerder et al. 2019 study) 
• If an ingredient is not biosecure, or if you don’t know if you can use a mitigation process or 
increase holding time to reduce risk, or if you don’t get it from a reputable company/location, it is 
higher risk.  
• ASFv encodes for genes to repair itself. Therefore, even though it may be inactivated, it can 
reactivate and repair itself. The capsid can be inactivated without eliminating the genome-DNA 
molecule itself which can make it contagious. The cell itself engulfs the virus making the DNA 
the problem. ASFv is one of the most stable virus groups known in literature. We cannot treat this 
virus like other viruses. 
• How sure are we of the effectiveness of inactivation mitigation strategies, and when is 
inactivation good enough?  
• ASFv cannot replicate in another animal. 
• ASFv is a very specific virus that cannot be carried by other species, but there is potential risk of 
contamination through non-swine feed ingredients used in multi-species feed mills.  
• Discussed documents available on swinehealth.org 
• If contaminated, feed is a vector. 
• We need a scientifically based document describing the unique characteristics of ASFv compared 
to other viruses. This is important because we need to know how it behaves, what its capable of 
doing, how it can be inactivated, and when it can repair itself. Also an explanation of how to 
interpret virology research results is needed. 
• Vitamin production is very different than other types of feed ingredient production and 
transportation processes. Media attention has focused on images of rural China with grain being 
dried on the soil, which does not apply to raw materials used in vitamin production.  
• We need to actively differentiate how vitamins are different from other feed ingredients and 
communicate that information to pork producers. This will include images of sanitary, highly 
sophisticated vitamin production facilities and how they operate. 
 
Vitamin supply with China: 
• Need update statistics of global vitamin production, the proportion produced in China, and 
current quality control/quality assurance procedures used in China to reflect the current situation.  
• Producers want to remove all China-based vitamin sources but that is not realistic.  
• Because there are only a few major vitamin producers, any improvement in biosecurity and 
quality assurance programs should be relatively easy to implement. 
• Do any of these quality assurance procedures apply to the context of virus transmission? 
o The short answer is no. Instead they have generic risk assessments 
o Companies can make specific assessments as needed based on general understandings on 
preventing contamination of other biological pathogens. QA specifics may not be spelled 
out in the process, but the system already is heading in the right direction. 
o Most of QA procedures address bacterial contamination and not virus.   
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• Some certifications create a process of HACCP principles to minimize risk of exposure from 
where we know many pathogens may originate. Part of the process is keeping known risks to 
swine away from the process. Procedures in place for other reasons will still be useful. This 
information needs to be communicated.  
• What additional measures need to be reviewed and implemented to help the feed and pork 
industry feel confident in their supply source? 
 
Risk based preventative controls: 
o Time and temperature conditions should be known for virus survival and inactivation. 
o Validate and verify that these conditions are achieved in specific ingredient processing. 
o Outline steps that decrease risk to help build trust with end-users. 
o Example of gelatin: identify heating processes that can reduce virus survival and verify that the 
manufacturers are meeting these temperature conditions.  
o Risk of cross contamination in other feed ingredients. 
o Extrapolation of virus survival can be dangerous, rarely follows a linear decrease in 
concentration. Holding times should not be the only risk mitigation strategy to use. 
o We could use a portion of the PEDv model and apply it to the vitamin supply chain. This can be 
developed into a document that can be communicated and distributed to pork producers.  
o There is a difference between general controls and preventive controls. When a virus is 
elevated to be considered a significant hazard, it adds a lot of additional unnecessary 
measures. The terminology needs to be rethought. 
o A process control approach is a good way to take viruses into account, but we need to be 
careful with how it is described.  
o The issue is more related to the intensity and frequency of monitoring, the regulatory 
work that will go with it, and the oversight involved. 
o We also need to be careful when considering using a risk assessment approach from a 
food safety standard and perspective. 
 
Virus surrogate: 
o Classify 2500 viruses, ASF stands on its own and is an extraordinary virus. 
o Closest relative is an algae virus that is common in the ocean. 
o ASF and algae virus are both double stranded DNA virus, similar structures, similar capsid 
structures, encode for evolutionary similar enzymes, and stand on their own regarding 
classification. 
o The algae virus could serve as a surrogate virus for ASFv that will not infect any animals in the 
supply chain. 
o Using the surrogate virus would be a good way to address the question of a negative result (i.e. 
you know you added the virus and so the test should come back positive). 
o A surrogate virus could also be used to evaluate effectiveness of inactivation mitigation 
treatments and confirm negative test results. 
o If the virus is released, it doesn’t matter because it is already out there in the natural environment. 
o Comparison between ASF data and algae survival data- ideally the surrogate should be slightly 
more resistant than the virus of interest.  
o Temperature data for inactivation are similar, but still unknown with other types of 
treatments 
o First part would include validation data 
o Could be tested in the field 
o Using a surrogate virus would be useful in quality control processes because you no 
longer have to take someone’s word for the temperature and time conditions used.  




Breakout Discussions – Questions: 
o Q1: What steps are needed to reduce actual risk in the supply chain while satisfying 
producer concerns? 
o Q2: What are unintended consequences? 
 
Breakout Session (Group A): 
o What steps are needed to reduce actual risk in the supply chain while satisfying producer 
concerns? 
o We need to describe how to reduce risk of ASFv transmission in feed (vitamins) 
▪ Already a significant amount of quality assurance procedures in place for 
regulation.  
▪ What needs to be done to confirm the approach we have is effective? 
▪ There are still unknowns- further understanding on the virus characteristics, what 
it takes to kill it or isolate it is needed. 
▪ Once that is defined, we can evaluate existing processes to assess if they are 
adequate to reduce virus concentration if it is present. 
▪ Additional treatments, such as additives as mitigations strategies, need to be 
evaluated.  
▪ Need accurate tests to identify contaminant. PCR? Bioassay? Where/how do we 
obtain representative samples for this? What about using disinfectants?  
▪ Little is known about the virus or if a specific vitamin would be a good carrier. 
▪ What steps along the supply chain are the critical points for contamination? 
▪ Focus on carriers (those are mostly U.S.A. products). 
▪ Unintended consequence for testing-what happens when you find it?  
▪ Temperature and humidity in different matrix conditions need to be evaluated for 
this virus. 
o We need to understand the potential risk for contamination. 
o Produce a one-page handout that outlines current biosecurity practices in place to ensure 
safety and quality in vitamins from China. Should also include a photo of the inside of a 
facility.  
▪ Also include the chemical process and regulations  
▪ What if there is damage to the bag? Is it disposed of? IT GOES TO THE TRASH 
▪ Producers recognize that vitamins are a lower risk than other feed ingredients 
▪ Common carriers are used to haul packaged products, will use clear wrap and 
cardboard to protect from damage 
▪ Manufacturing sites only produce high-grade vitamins for feed and humans.  
▪ About 30 companies manufacture vitamins and bring them to the U.S. Different 
companies have different standards on what is required of each company.  
▪ For Company 2, there is an extensive audit of the manufacturing facility that 
conducts over multiple years. The liability is so high and there is motivation to 
audit everything. The company also audits the manufacturing facility. The FDA 
sometimes inspects European plants, but not sure on the Chinese plants. 
▪ Just because there are certifications it does not mean it is necessarily compliant. 
Global quality management sends in people to evaluate and verify.  
▪ System is automated, but not high output. Negative pressure, high quality 
▪ COMMUNICATION IS KEY 
o Can we create harmonized manufacturing biosecurity strategies that focus specifically on 
ASFv? Or all viruses in feed? Can we do that? 





o What are the unintended consequences of achieving the desired level of risk? 
o Note on early comment on FDA implications: It is more of an issue that we cannot 
confirm if it is effective since the virus can repair itself.  
o Vitamin supply is not always readily available and experiences shortages. Currently 
unrelated explosion has made vitamin processing go under review for safety reasons. It is 
not always guaranteed that the vitamins will be available.  
o The supply is coming from China, we can’t not use their products.  
o China is only source of B6 and biotin. Limiting other vitamin sources to outside of China 
will result in more demand than supply, and that takes a while to work through the 
industry.  
o Pork producers need to use reputable suppliers, not those in the black market. There is 
concern about a small number of bad suppliers that can cause virus introduction if 
contaminated that would affect the entire industry. 
▪ The barrier to entry from the broker in the U.S. is low, and if the price is low 
enough, somebody will buy it. This is very difficult to control and will take too 
much time to shut them down. 
▪ Recent import rules had that mindset of trying to prevent and regulate such a 
situation, but it is not perfect.  
▪ Include this part of the vitamin supply chain in the risk assessment.  
▪ Continue to encourage pork producers to identify reputable suppliers 
▪ Increasing transparency on the biosecurity and quality assurance processes in 
place will help put pork producers at ease and make them aware of false claims. 
▪ Three item questionnaire for producers to give to their premix producers to weed 
out high risk vitamin suppliers.  
▪ As FDA steps up animal feed inspections, some of these can be eliminated. 
▪ For several B vitamins, brokers are a significant part of the supply chain.  
▪ Even though you have a Certificate of Analysis (CoA), it can still be a result of a 
broker. 
▪ Pirates are selling straights, not premixes. 
▪ We are only as good as our weakest link. 
▪ Black market risk can be at manufacturing or distributing. 
▪ Note: Toll market manufacturing is not bad but depends on how it is done. 
▪ Small to mid-size regional blenders will buy from pirates to compete with larger 
companies.  
▪ Somebody is still going to buy what is rejected by large companies. 
▪ Provide leadership and information and let the market do its job. 
o If we add a holding period, will the vitamins lose potency? Is also true with thermal 
treatments and other treatments? Most are stable over a year in unopened bag (vit A is 15 
months, E is 24 months, K3 is 24 months) 
▪ 6 weeks is the absolute shortest time period for vitamins to come from China to a 
U.S. feed mill. 
▪ The challenge is to try to manage inventory to keep it at a low working level and 
reduce cost. 
▪ Warehouses are not heated or cool, sometimes it gets warm, but usually the 
temperature is between 50-60 degrees. 
o Provide traceability for pork producers 
▪ Bags come with a certificate of analysis (or certificate of conformance), when it 
was manufactured, and for every lot of every vitamin. If it is a customer 
requirement, another sample will be collected and retained for the total premix. 
They can also provide a country of origin statement. These are customer tailored 
documents that suppliers can create. Documents are provided to feed mills and 
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customer can access it. This adds traceability to the process, but it also will add 
cost.  
▪ Pork producers can decide if they want to pay the extra cost for these additional 
documents to provide choices and more information. 
▪ Compared to other feed ingredients, the vitamin industry has the advantage that 
the digital technology is already in place to implement block chain technology 
(traceability solution where you can see chain of custody and who worked with 
it. Once it is put in the chain it cannot be changed, but ability to view details can 
be altered) 
▪ Develop a FAQ and make available on what is being done to control for ASF 
▪ It is important to document inventory turnover of vitamins/premixes. 
▪ Economics will make decisions on what the producer decides to do, usually this 
means that the producer will take the risk only if they are making a profit.  
▪ Producers just want to know what is happening. 
o Biosecurity add-on module  
▪ It is important to communicate additional verification points that a manufacturer 
is adhering to relative to biosecurity practices.  
▪ This would be done by a third party. 
▪ This would help build trust among pork producers. 
▪ Lobby the organization to embrace and add this piece to existing quality 
assurance procedures. 
▪ AFIA has a biosecurity guide, but needs more information on what happens at a 
vitamin manufacturing facility to apply it to ASFv and vitamins 
▪ Realistically could take a year to develop this module but we should consider it 
as an add-on to existing procedures. 
o Determine if the risk actually exists 
▪ Identify possibilities of where the virus could come from instead of testing 
▪ Vulnerability assessment-based risk assessment could take 6 months to 2 years 
and would require: 
• Good understanding of supply chain 
• Potential sources of contamination (e.g. blood, feces) 
▪ Concerns about spending time on vitamins when the risk is low. If the virus gets 
here, we are too late.  
▪ Could be done from an international assessment - then could add information on 
if it does get here, then what? 
▪ After it is created with vitamins, it will be easy to replicate and apply to other 
feed ingredients 
▪ How do we sample and how many samples are needed? The USDA will not 
allow testing. How are you going to prove a negative? When can you say it is not 
a risk? 
 
Breakout Session (Group B): 
1) Communication may not decrease risk, but necessary to create trust of pork producers. 
2) Communicate that risk is minimal or none, and vitamin manufacturers use human grade standards 
for vitamins used in animal feed. Premix blenders may be animal feed only. 
3) Collect data on time x temperature conditions that inactivate the virus and apply to chemical and 
fermentation processes of vitamin production 
4) The Food and Drug Administration has inspectors in China. However, based on risk matrix, 
inspection of vitamin suppliers may be infrequent. 




Breakout Session (Group C): 
 
• Most communication about prevention measures has been among vitamin companies and within 
pre-mix companies; limited information sharing down to the producer level. 
o Create a communication cascade to the producer level. 
• With respect to ASF, there was an “arms race of mitigation” by some for competitive advantage 
(claims regarding best measures for prevention were inconsistent/different messages from 
different pre-mix manufacturers re: start date, duration of holding time). 
• There is universal concern regarding control measures, including holding time. 
• Need to work with a neutral authority that all producers trust (SHIC, Pork Board, etc.) as vehicle 
for delivery. 
• Companies need to be transparent regarding vitamins and carriers (general comments on this 
topic follow). 
o Relatively few carriers and coatings 
o Vitamin E production is a chemical process; facility looks like a refinery 
o B5 used for food and feed are the same 
o Consider a fact sheet for each segment or type of vitamin? 
• Need to be transparent re: carriers and country of origin 
• Provide pork producers with three questions to ask their premix supplier 
 
Most compelling concepts: 
o Some vitamins are sold by traders and brokers and this needs to be considered in a risk 
assessment 
o Storing vitamins has added cost, market volatility, and potency loss of vitamins 
o Problems with testing - if you look for it what happens if you find it? 
o Potential research- vitamins as a test case for block chain, dose and inactivation of ASFv,  
o Vulnerability assessment - does the risk exist? Where is the risk for contamination? 
o Communication - facilities on where they are produced, questionnaires, allow producers to make 
their own judgements, the process, pictures, chemicals used 
o Biosecurity module - potentially lobby an add on, AFIA biosecurity extension to vitamins,  
 
Closing discussion: 
o With confidence, we can say: 
o ASF potential introduction via feed is a definite and increasing threat to the pork supply 
chain 
o Risk of introduction through vitamins is low given standard manufacturing practices 
today (statement from several publications including USDA documents) 
▪ Cannot be guaranteed if such industry standards are not followed 
▪ Pork producers have the responsibility to ask questions and gain information on 
their supply- know your supplier 
▪ Letter of guarantee is not accurate term - instead letter of best practices 
o Most effective approach to reduce risk is to tell and show producers what you are doing 
and keep them informed 
o Additional research: 
o Vitamins as test case for implementing block chain  
o Determine virus inactivation conditions 
o Conduct a vulnerability assessment 
o Conduct research to develop a surrogate virus for testing applications in feed ingredients 
o Chinese manufactured choline on corn cobs – identify broker network from 5 or 6 major 
choline companies that sell into the United States 
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o Compile information on: 
o structure of the supply chain  
o characteristics of the virus 
o terminology and process control 
o biosecurity practices and add-on module 
o what are the carriers/coatings, where do they come from, and why are they safe 
▪ UMN can start a draft and share with the team for accuracy and input 
▪ Missing piece of the blending, carrier, source of origin, and other components 
that encapsulates the story of the entire chain. 
o There are many different, simple statements that need to be given to the pork industry to 
communicate this information.  
▪ Carriers are produced in the USA, ripped bags are destroyed, facilities have high 
standards, facilities are clean. 
▪ Include definitions on what is straight, blend down, and other technical terms 
▪ Everyone should place this information in the CoA, FAQ, or other document and 
other specific components can be shared by the company to consumers who 
request it.  
▪ Can you buy premix right out of China- yes, but to the local market, no because it 
is not economical for it to be shipped to the U.S. Broker market for premix is 
limited. This is not a risk for specific companies, but is a risk overall. 
 
